Abstract. XML access control policies involving updates may contain security flaws, here called inconsistencies, in which a forbidden operation may be simulated by performing a sequence of allowed operations. This paper investigates the problem of deciding whether a policy is consistent, and if not, how its inconsistencies can be repaired. We consider policies expressed in terms of annotated DTDs defining which operations are allowed or denied for the XML trees that are instances of the DTD. We show that consistency is decidable in PTIME for such policies and that consistent partial policies can be extended to unique "leastprivilege" consistent total policies. We also consider repair problems based on deleting privileges to restore consistency, show that finding minimal repairs is NP-complete, and give heuristics for finding repairs.
Introduction
Discretionary access control policies for database systems can be specified in a number of different ways, for example by storing access control lists as annotations on the data itself (as in most file systems), or using rules which can be applied to decide whether to grant access to protected resources. In relational databases, high-level policies that employ rules, roles, and other abstractions tend to be much easier to understand and maintain than access control list-based policies; also, they can be implemented efficiently using static techniques, and can be analyzed off-line for security vulnerabilities [6] .
Rule-based, fine-grained access control techniques for XML data have been considered extensively for read-only queries [10, 14, 13, 12, 2, 16, 9] . However, the problem of controlling write access is relatively new and has not received much attention. Authors in [2, 9, 15 ] studied enforcement of write-access control policies following annotationbased approaches.
In this paper, we build upon the schema-based access control model introduced by Stoica and Farkas [18] , refined by Fan, Chan, and Garofalakis [10] , and extended to write-access control by Fundulaki and Maneth [12] . We investigate the problem of checking for, and repairing, a particular class of vulnerabilities in XML write-access control policies. An access control policy specifies which actions to allow a user to perform based on the syntax of the atomic update, not its actual behavior. Thus, it is possible that a single-step action which is explicitly forbidden by the policy can nevertheless be simulated by one or more allowed actions. This is what we mean by an inconsistency; a consistent policy is one in which such inconsistencies are not possible. We believe inconsistencies are an interesting class of policy-level security vulnerabilities since such policies allow users to circumvent the intended effect of the policy. The purpose of this paper is to define consistency, understand how to determine whether a policy is consistent, and show how to automatically identify possible repairs for inconsistent policies.
Motivating Example: We introduce here an example and refer to it throughout the paper. Consider the XML DTD represented as a graph in Fig. 1(a) . A document conforming to this DTD has as root an R-element with a single child element that can either be an A, B, J or K-element (indicated with dashed edges); similarly for G. An A-element has one C and one D children elements. A B-element can have zero or more E children elements (indicated with * -labeled edges); similarly, E and J elements can have zero or more G children elements. Finally, F , H, I and K are text elements. Fig. 1 (b) and (c) show two documents that conform to the DTD. Suppose that a security policy allows one to insert and delete G elements and forbids one from replacing an H with an I element. It is straightforward to see that the forbidden operation can be simulated by first deleting the G element with an H child and then inserting a G element with an I child. There are different ways of fixing this inconsistency: either (a) to allow all operations below element G or (b) forbid one of the insert and delete operations at node G. Now, suppose that the policy allows one to replace an A-element with a B-element and this with a J-element, but forbids the replacement of A with J elements. The latter operation can be easily simulated by performing a sequence of the allowed operations. As in the previous case, the repairs that one can propose are (a) to allow the forbidden replace operation or (b) forbid one of the allowed operations.
Our contributions: In this paper we consider policies that are defined in terms of non-recursive structured XML DTDs as introduced in [10] that capture without loss of generality more general non-recursive DTDs. We first consider total policies in which all allowed or forbidden privileges are explicitly specified. We define consistency for such policies and prove the correctness of a straightforward polynomial time algorithm for consistency checking. We also consider partial policies in which privileges may be omitted. Such a policy is consistent if it can be extended to a consistent total policy; there may be many such extensions, but we identify a canonical least-privilege consis-tent extension, and show that this can be found in polynomial time (if it exists). Finally, given an inconsistent (partial or total) policy, we consider the problem of finding a "repair", or minimal changes to the policy which restore consistency. We consider repairs based on changing operations from allowed to forbidden, show that finding minimal repairs is NP-complete, and provide heuristic repair algorithms that run in polynomial time.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows: in Section 2 we provide the definitions for XML DTDs and trees. Section 3 discusses i) the atomic updates and ii) the access control policies that we are considering. Consistency is discussed in Section 4; Section 5 discusses algorithms for detecting and repairing inconsistent policies. We conclude in Section 6. Proofs of theorems and detailed algorithms can be found in the Appendix.
XML DTDs and Trees
We consider structured XML DTDs as discussed in [10] . Although not all DTDs are syntactically representable in this form, one can (as argued by [10] ) represent more general DTDs by introducing new element types. The DTDs we consider here are 1-unambiguous as required by the XML standard [4] .
Definition 1 (XML DTD).
Let L be the infinite domain of labels. A DTD D is represented by (Ele, Rg, rt) where i) Ele ⊆ L is a finite set of element types ii) rt is a distinguished type in Ele called the root type and iii) Rg defines the element types: that is, for any A ∈ Ele, Rg(A) is a regular expression of the form:
where B i ∈ Ele are distinct, ",", "+" and " * " stand for concatenation, disjunction and Kleene star respectively, ǫ for the EMPTY element content and str for text values.
We will refer to A → Rg(A) as the production rule for A. An element type B i that appears in the production rule of an element type A is called the subelement type of A. We write A ≤ D B for the transitive, reflexive closure of the subelement relation.
A DTD can also be represented as a directed acyclic graph that we call DTD graph.
Definition 2 (DTD Graph
is a directed acyclic graph (DAG) where i) V D is the set of nodes for the element types in Ele ∪ {str}, ii) E D = {(A, B) | A, B ∈ Ele and B is a subelement type of A} and iii) r D is the distinguished node rt.
Example 1. The production rules for the DTD graph shown in Fig. 1 are:
We model XML documents as rooted unordered trees with labels from L ∪ {str}.
Definition 3 (XML Tree
). An unordered XML tree t is an expression of the form t = (N t , E t , λ t , r t , v t ) where i) N t is the set of nodes ii) E t ⊂ N t × N t is the set of edges, iii) λ t : N t → L ∪ {str} is a labeling function over nodes iv) r t is the root of t and is a distinguished node in N t and v) v t is a function that assigns a string value to nodes labeled with str.
We denote by children t (n), parent t (n) and desc t (n), the children, parent and descendant nodes, respectively, of a node n in an XML tree t. The set desc e t (n) denotes the edges in E t between descendant nodes of n. A node labeled with an element type A in DTD D is called an instance of A.
We say that an XML tree t = (N t , E t , λ t , r t , v t ) conforms to a DTD D = (Ele, Rg, rt) at element type A if i) r t is labeled with A (i.e., λ t (r t ) = A) ii) each node in N t is labeled with either an Ele element type B or with str, iii) each node in t labeled with an Ele element type B has a list of children nodes such that their labels are in the language defined by Rg(B) and iv) each node in t labeled with str has a string value (v t (n) is defined) and is a leaf of the tree. An XML tree t is a valid instance of the DTD D if r t is labeled with rt. We write I D (A) for the set of valid instances of D at element type A, and I D for I D (rt).
Definition 4 (XML Tree Isomorphism).
We say that an XML tree t 1 is isomorphic to an XML tree t 2 , denoted t 1 ≡ t 2 , iff there exists a bijection h :
XML Access Control Framework

Atomic Updates
Our updates are modeled on the XQuery Update Facility draft [7] , which considers delete, replace and several insert update operations. A delete(n) operation will delete node n and all its descendants. A replace(n, t) operation will replace the subtree with root n by the tree t. A replace(n, s) operation will replace the text value of node n with string s. There are several types of insert operations, e.g., insert into(n, t), insert before(n, t), insert after(n, t), insert as first(n, t), insert as last(n, t). Update insert into(n, t) inserts the root of t as a child of n whereas update insert as first(n, t) (insert as last(n, t)) inserts the root of t as a first (resp. last) child of n. Update operations insert before(n, t) and insert after(n, t) insert the root node of t as a preceding and following sibling of n resp..
Since we only consider unordered XML trees, we deal only with the operation insert into(n, t) (for readability purposes, we are going to write insert(n, t)). Thus, in what follows, we will restrict to four types of update operations: delete(n), replace(n, t), replace(n, s) and insert(n, t).
More formally, for a tree t 1 = (N t1 ,E t1 , λ t1 , r t1 , v t1 ), a node n in t 1 , a tree t 2 = (N t2 , E t2 , λ t2 , r t2 , v t2 ) and a string value s, the result of applying insert(n, t 2 ), replace(n, t 2 ), delete(n) and replace(n, s) to t 1 , is a new tree t = (N t , E t , λ t , r t , v t ) defined as shown in Table 1 . We denote by [[op] ](t) the result of applying update operation op on tree t.
An update operation insert(n, t 2 ), replace(n, t 2 ), replace(n, s) or delete(n) is valid with respect to tree t 1 provided n ∈ N t1 and t 2 , if present, does not overlap with t 1 (that is, N t1 ∩N t2 = ∅). We also consider update sequences op 1 ; . . . ; op n with the (standard) semantics
A sequence of updates op 1 ; . . . ; op n is valid with respect to t 0 if for each i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, op i+1 is valid with 
Access Control Framework
We use the notion of update access type to specify the access authorizations in our context. Our update access types are inspired from the XAcU annot language discussed in [12] . Authors followed the idea of security annotations introduced in [10] to specify the access authorizations for XML documents in the presence of a DTD. Intuitively, an UAT represents a set of atomic update operations. More specifically, for t an instance of DTD D, op an atomic update and uat an update access type we say that op matches uat on t (op matches t uat) if:
It is trivial to translate our update access types to XAcU annot security annotations. In this work we assume that the evaluation of an update operation on a tree that conforms to a DTD D results in a tree that conforms to D. It is clear then that each update access type only makes sense for specific element types. For our example DTD, the update access type (A, delete(C)) is not meaningful because allowing the deletion of a C-element would result in an XML document that does not conform to the DTD, and therefore, the update will be rejected. Similar for (R, delete(A)) or (R, insert(A)). But, (B, delete(E)) and (B, insert(E)) are relevant for this specific DTD. The relation uat valid in D, which indicates that an update access type uat is valid for the DTD D, is defined as follows:
We define the set of valid UATs for a given DTD D as valid(D) = {uat | uat valid in D}. A security policy will be defined by a set of allowed and forbidden valid UATs.
Definition 6.
A security policy P defined over a DTD D, is represented by (A, F ) where A is the set of allowed and F the set of forbidden update access types defined over
Example 2. Consider the DTD D in Fig. 1 and the total policy P = (A, F ) where A is:
and F = valid(D) \ A. On the other hand, P = (A, ∅) is a partial policy.
2
The operations that are allowed by a policy P = (A, F ) on an XML tree t, denoted by
, are the union of the atomic update operations matching each UAT in A.
More formally, [[A]
](t) = {op | op matches t uat on t, and uat ∈ A}. We say an update sequence op 1 ; . . . ; op n is allowed on t provided the sequence is valid on t and
1 Analogously, the forbidden operations are [[F ]](t) = {op | op matches t uat on t, and uat ∈ F }. If a policy P is total, its semantics is given by its allowed updates, i.e.
[[P ]](t) = [[A]](t).
The semantics of a partial policy is studied in detail in Section 4.1.
Consistent Policies
A policy is said to be consistent if it is not possible to simulate a forbidden update through a sequence of allowed updates. More formally: 
In our framework inconsistencies can be classified as: insert/delete and replace.
Inconsistencies due to insert/delete operations arise when the policy allows one to insert and delete nodes of element type A whilst forbidding some operation in some descendant element type of the node. In this case, the forbidden operation can be simulated by first deleting an A-element and then inserting a new A-element after having done the necessary modifications.
There are two kinds of inconsistencies created by replace operations on a production rule A → B 1 + · · · + B n of a DTD. First, if we are allowed to replace B i by B j and B j by B k but not B i by B k , then one can simulate the latter operation by a sequence of the first two. Second, consider that we are allowed to replace some element type B i with an element type B j and vice versa. If some operation in the subtree of either B i or B j is forbidden, then it is evident that one can simulate the forbidden operation by a sequence of allowed operations, leading to an inconsistency.
We say that nothing is forbidden below A in a policy
We write G + A for the transitive graph of G A . The following theorem characterizes policy consistency:
Theorem 1. A policy P = (A, F ) defined over DTD D is consistent if and only if for every production rule:
Proof (Sketch) . The forward direction is straightforward, since if any of the rules are violated an inconsistency can be found, as sketched above. For the reverse direction, we first need to reduce allowed update sequences to certain (allowed) normal forms that are easier to analyze, then the reasoning proceeds by cases. A full proof is given in Appendix A. 2
In the case of total policies, condition 2 in Theorem 1 amounts to requiring that the replace graph G A is transitive (i.e.,
Example 3. (example 2 continued) The total policy P is inconsistent because:
, and -There are cycles in G R involving both B and J, but below both of them there is a forbidden UAT, namely (G, replace(H, I)) (condition 3, Theorem 1)
It is easy to see that we can check whether properties 1, 2, and 3 hold for a policy using standard graph algorithms: Proposition 1. The problem of deciding policy consistency is in PTIME.
Remark 1. We wish to emphasize that consistency is highly sensitive to the design of policies and update types. For example, we have consciously chosen to omit an update type (A, replace(B i , B i )) for an element type in the DTD whose production rule is either of the form B * or B 1 + . . . + B n . Consider the case of a conference management system where a paper element has a decision and a title subelement. Suppose that the policy allows the author of the paper to replace a paper with another paper element, but forbids to change the value of the decision subelement. This policy is inconsistent since by replacing a paper element by another with a different decision subelement we are able to perform a forbidden update. In fact, the replace(paper, paper) can simulate any other update type applying below a paper element. Thus, if the policy forbids replacement of paper nodes, then it would be inconsistent to allow any other operation on decision and title. Because of this problem, we argue that update types replace(B i , B i ) should not be used in policies. Instead, more specific privileges should be assigned individually, e.g., by allowing replacement of the text values of title or decision.
Partial Policies
Partial policies may be smaller and easier to maintain than total policies, but are ambiguous because some permissions are left unspecified. An access control mechanism must either allow or deny a request. One solution to this problem (in accordance with the principle of least privilege) might be to deny access to the unspecified operations. However, there is no guarantee that the resulting total policy is consistent. Indeed, it is not obvious that a partial policy (even if consistent) has any consistent total extension. We will now show how to find consistent extensions, if they exist, and in particular how to find a "least-privilege" consistent extension; these turn out to be unique when they exist so seem to be a natural choice for defining the meaning of a partial policy. For convenience, we write A P and F P for the allowed and forbidden sets of a policy P ; i.e., P = (A P , F P ). We introduce an information ordering P ⊑ Q, defined as A P ⊆ A Q and F P ⊆ F Q ; that is, Q is "more defined" than P . In this case, we say that Q extends P . We say that a partial policy P is quasiconsistent if it has a consistent total extension. For example, a partial policy on the DTD of Figure 1 which allows (B, insert(E)), (B, delete(E)), and denies (H, replace(str, str)) is not quasiconsistent, because any consistent extension of the policy has to allow (H, replace(str, str)).
We also introduce a privilege ordering on total policies P ≤ Q, defined as A P ⊆ A Q ; that is, Q allows every operation that is allowed in P . This ordering has unique greatest lower bounds P ∧ Q defined as (A P ∩ A Q , F P ∪ F Q ). We now show that every quasiconsistent policy has a least-privilege consistent extension P † ; that is, P † is consistent and P † ≤ Q whenever Q is a consistent extension of P .
Proof. It is easy to see that if P 1 , P 2 extend P 0 then P 1 ∧ P 2 extends P 0 . Suppose P 1 ∧ P 2 is inconsistent. Then there exists an XML tree t, an atomic operation
, so op 0 must be forbidden by either P 1 or P 2 . On the other hand, op must be allowed by both P 1 and P 2 , so t, op 0 , op forms a counterexample to the consistency of P 1 (or symmetrically P 2 ). 2 Proposition 2. Each quasiconsistent policy P has a unique ≤-least consistent total extension P † .
Proof. Since P is quasiconsistent, the set S = {Q | P ⊑ Q, Q consistent} is finite, nonempty, and closed under ∧, so has a ≤-least element P † = S. 2
Finally, we show how to find the least-privilege consistent extension, or determine that none exists (and hence that the partial policy is not quasiconsistent). Define the operator T : P(valid(D)) → P(valid(D)) as:
If uat ∈ T (S) then any operation op 0 matching uat on t can be simulated using a sequence of operations op allowed on t by S (that is, such that
Theorem 2. Let P be a partial policy. The following are equivalent:
Proof. To show (1) implies (2), if P ′ is a consistent extension of P , then any inconsistency in P would be an inconsistency in P ′ , so P must be consistent. To show (2) implies (3), we prove the contrapositive. If T (A P ) ∩ F P = ∅ then choose uat ∈ T (A P )∩F P . Choose an arbitrary tree t and atomic update op satisfying op 0 ∈ [ Hence, policy P is inconsistent. Finally, to show that (3) implies (1), note that (T (A P ), valid(D) \ T (A P )) extends P and is consistent provided T (A P ) ∩ F P = ∅.
Indeed, for a (quasi-)consistent P , the least-privilege consistent extension of P is simply P † = (T (A P ), valid(D) \ T (A P )) (proof omitted). Hence, we can decide whether a partial policy is (quasi-)consistent and if so find P † in PTIME.
Repairs
If a policy is inconsistent, we would like to suggest possible minimal ways of modifying it in order to restore consistency. In other words, we would like to find repairs that are as close as possible to the inconsistent policy.
There are several ways of defining these repairs. We might want to repair by changing the permissions of certain operations from allow to forbidden and vice versa; or we might give preference to some type of changes over others. Also, we can measure the minimality of the repairs as a minimal number of changes or a minimal set of changes under set inclusion.
Due to space restrictions, in this paper we will focus on finding repairs that transform UATs from allowed to forbidden and that minimize the number of changes. We believe that such repairs are a useful special case, since the repairs are guaranteed to be more restrictive than the original policy.
Definition 8. A policy P
is a repair of a policy P = (A, F ) defined over a DTD D iff: i) P ′ is a policy defined over D, ii) P ′ is consistent, and iii) P ′ ≤ P . A repair is total if F ′ = valid(D) \ A and partial otherwise. Furthermore a repair
Given a policy P = (A, F ) and an integer k, the total-repair (partial-repair) problem consists in determining if there exists a total-repair (partial-repair)
This problem can be shown to be NP-hard by reduction from the edge-deletion transitive-digraph problem [19] . If the DTD has no production rules of the type A → B 1 + · · ·+ B n , then the total-repair problem is in PTIME.
Repair Algorithm
In this section we discuss a repair algorithm that finds a minimal repair of a total or partial policy. All the algorithms can be found in Appendix B.
The algorithm to compute a minimal repair of a policy relies in the independence between inconsistencies w.r.t. insert/delete (Theorem 1, condition 1) and replace (Theorem 1, conditions 2 and 3) operations. In fact, a local repair of an inconsistency w.r.t. insert/delete operations will never solve nor create an inconsistency with respect to a replace operation and vice-versa. We will separately describe the algorithm for repairing the insert/delete inconsistencies and then the algorithm for the replace ones.
Both algorithms make use of the marked DTD graph M G D = (G D , µ, χ) where µ is a function from nodes in V D to {"+", "−"} and χ is a partial function from V D to {⊥}. In a marked graph for a DTD D and a policy P = (A, F ) i) each node in the graph is either marked with "+" (i.e., nothing is forbidden below the node) or with a "−" (i.e., there exists at least one update access type that is forbidden below the node). If, for nodes A and B in the DTD, both (A, insert(B)) and (A, delete(B)) are in A and µ(A) = "−", then χ(A) = "⊥". A marked graph is obtained from algorithm markGraph which takes as input a DTD graph and a policy P and traverses the DTD graph starting from the nodes with out-degree 0 and marks the nodes and edges as discussed above. Fig. 2 (a) and policy P = (A, F ), with A defined in Example 2. The result of applying markGraph to this DTD and policy is shown in Fig. 2(b) . Notice that nodes B, E and J are marked with both a "−" and "⊥" since i) update access type (G, replace(H, I)) is in F and ii) all insert and delete update access types for B, E and J are in A. For readability purposes we do not show the multiplicities in the marked DTD graph. 
Example 4. Consider the graph for DTD D in
Repairing Inconsistencies for Insert and Delete Operations
Recall that if both the insert and delete operations are allowed at some element type and there is some operation below this type that is not allowed, then there is an inconsistency (see Theorem 1, condition 1). The marked DTD graph provides exactly this information: a node A is labeled with "⊥" if it is inconsistent w.r.t. insert/delete operations. For each such node and for the repair strategy that we have chosen, the inconsistency can be minimally repaired by removing either (A, insert(B)) or (A, delete(B)) from A. Algorithm InsDelRepair takes as input a DTD graph G D and a security policy P = (A, F ) and returns a set of UATs to remove from A to restore consistency w.r.t. insert/deleteinconsistencies.
Example 5. Given the marked DTD graph in Fig. 2(b) , it is easy to see that the UATs that must be repaired are associated with nodes B, J and E (all nodes are marked with "⊥"). The repairs that can be proposed to the user are to remove from A one UAT from each of the following sets: {(B, insert(E)), (B, delete(E))}, {(E, insert(G)), (E, delete(G))} and {(J, insert(G)), (J, delete(G))}. 2
Repairing Inconsistencies for Replace Operations There are two types of inconsistencies related to replace operations (see Theorem 1, conditions 2-3): the first arises when some element A is contained in some cycle and something is forbidden below it; the second arises when the replace graph G A cannot be extended to a transitive graph without adding a forbidden edge in F . In what follows we will refer to these type of inconsistencies as negative-cycle and forbidden-transitivity. By Theorem 3, the repair problem is NP-complete, and therefore, unless P = NP, there is no polynomial time algorithm to compute a minimal repair to the replace-inconsistencies. Our objective then, is to find an algorithm that runs in polynomial time and computes a repair that is not necessarily minimal. Algorithm ReplaceNaive traverses the marked graph M G D and at each node, checks whether its production rule is of the form A → B 1 + . . . + B n . If this is the case, it builds the replace graph for A, G A , and runs a modified version of the FloydWarshall algorithm [11] . The original Floyd-Warshall algorithm adds an edge (B, D) to the graph if there is a node C such that (B, C) and (C, D) are in the graph and (B, D) is not. Our modification consists on deleting either (B, C) or (C, D) if (B, D) ∈ F A , i.e., if there is forbidden-transitivity. In this way, the final graph will satisfy condition 2 of Theorem 1. Also, if there are edges (B, C) and (C, B) and µ(C) = "−", i.e., there is a negative-cycle, one of the two edges is deleted. Algorithm ReplaceNaive returns the set of edges to delete from each node to remove replace-inconsistencies.
Example 6. The replace graph G G has no negative-cycles nor forbidden-transitivity, therefore it is not involved in any inconsistency. On the other hand, the replace graph G R = (V, E), shown in Fig. 3(a) is the source of many inconsistencies. A possible execution of ReplaceNaive (shown in Fig. 7 in the Appendix) is: (A, B) , (B, J) ∈ E but (A, J) ∈ F, so (A, B) or (B, J) should be deleted, say (A, B). Now, (B, J), (J, K) ∈ E and (B, K) ∈ F, therefore we delete either (B, J) or (J, K), say (B, J). Next, (K, J), (J, K) ∈ E and µ(J) = "−" in Fig. 2(b) , therefore there is a negative-cycle and either (K, J) or (J, K) has to be deleted. If (K, J) is deleted, the resulting graph has no forbidden-transitive and nor negative-cycles. The policy obtained by removing (R, replace(A, B)), (R, replace(B, J)) and (R, replace(J, K)) from A has no replaceinconsistencies.
The ReplaceNaive algorithm might remove more than the necessary edges to achieve consistency: in our example, if we had removed edge (B, J) at the first step, then we would have resolved the inconsistencies that involve edges (A, B), (B, J) and (J, K).
An alternative to algorithm ReplaceNaive, that can find a solution closer to minimal repair, is algorithm ReplaceSetCover, which also uses a modified version of the Floyd-Warshall algorithm. In this case, the modification consists in computing the transitive closure of the replace graph G A and labelling each newly constructed edge e with a set of justifications J . Each justification contains sets of edges of G A that were used to add e in G + A . Also, if a node is found to be part of a negative-cycle, it is labelled with the justifications J of the edges in each cycle that contains the node. An edge or vertex might be justified by more than one set of edges. In fact, the number of justifications an edge or node might have is O(2 |E| ). To avoid the exponential number of justifications, ReplaceSetCover() assigns at most J justifications to each edge or node, where J is a fixed number. This new labelled graph is then used to construct an instance of the minimum set cover problem (MSCP) [17] . The solution to the MSCP, can be used to determine the set of edges to remove from G A so that none of the justifications that create inconsistencies are valid anymore. Because of the upper bound J on the number of justifications, it might be the case that the graph still has forbiddentransitive or negative-cycles. Thus, the justifications have to be computed once more and the set cover run again until there are no more replace inconsistencies. Justifications for edges represent violations of transitivity. Justification for nodes represent negative-cycles. If we want to remove the inconsistencies, it is enough to delete one edge from each set in J . 2
The previous example shows that, for each node A, replace-inconsistencies can be repaired by removing at least one edge from each of the justifications of edges and vertices in G + A . It is easy to see that this problem can be reduced to the MSCP. An instance of the MSCP consists of a universe U and a set S of subsets of U. A subset C of S is a set cover if the union of the elements in it is U. A solution of the MWSCP is a set cover with the minimum number of elements.
The set cover instance associated to G + A = (V, E) and the set of forbidden edges
V ∈ V}, and ii) S = e∈E I(e) where I(e) = {s | s ∈ U, e ∈ s}. Intuitively, U contains all the inconsistencies, and the set I(e) the replace-inconsistencies in which an edge e is involved. Notice that in this instance of the MSCP, the U is a set of justifications, therefore, S is a set of sets of justifications. B) )}. The extensions of I are given in Table 2 , where each column corresponds to a set I and each row to an element in U. Values 1 and 0 in the table represent membership and non-membership respectively. A minimum set cover of MSCP (G + R ) is C = {I(B, J), I(J, K)}, since I(B, J) covers all the elements of U except for the element {(A, B), (B, J)}, which is covered by I(J, K). Now, using the solution from the set cover, we remove edges (B, J) and (J, K) from G R . If we try to compute the justifications once again, it turns out that there are no more negativecycles and that the graph is transitive. Therefore, by removing (R, replace(B, J)) and (R, replace(J, K)) from A, there are no replace-inconsistencies in node R.
Example 8. The minimum set cover instance, MSCP (G
The set cover problem is MAXSNP-hard [17] , but its solution can be approximated in polynomial time using a greedy-algorithm that can achieve an approximation factor of log(n) where n is the size of U [8] . In our case, n is O(J × |Ele|). In the ongoing example, the approximation algorithm of the set cover will return a cover of size 2. This is better than what was obtained by the ReplaceNaive algorithm. In order to decide which one is better, we need to run experiments to investigate the trade off between efficiency and the size of the repaired policy. Algorithm ReplaceRepair will compute the set of UATs to remove from A, by using either ReplaceNaive (if J = 0) or ReplaceSetCover (if J > 0).
Computation of a Repair Algorithm Repair computes a new consistent policy
by removing from A the union of the UATs returned by algorithms InsDelRepair and ReplaceRepair. If argument total of algorithm Repair is true, then the repair returned by it will be total. If false, then a partial policy such that F ′ = F will be returned.
Theorem 4. Given a total (partial) policy P , algorithm
Repair returns a total (partial) repair of P .
Conclusion
Access control policies attempt to constrain the actual operations users can perform, but are usually enforced in terms of syntactic representations of the operations. Thus, policies controlling update access to XML data may forbid certain operations but permit other operations that have the same effect. In this paper we have studied such inconsistency vulnerabilities and shown how to check consistency and repair inconsistent policies. This is, to our knowledge, the first investigation of consistency and repairs for XML update security. We also considered consistency and repair problems for partial policies which may be more convenient to write since many privileges may be left unspecified. Cautis, Abiteboul and Milo in [5] discuss XML update constraints to restrict insert and delete updates, and propose to detect updates that violate these constraints by measuring the size of the modification of the database. This approach differs from our security framework for two reasons: a) we consider in addition to insert/delete also replace operations and b) we require that each operation in the sequence of updates does not violate the security constraints, whereas in their case, they require that only the input and output database satisfies them.
Minimal repairs are used in the problem of returning consistent answers from inconsistent databases [1] . There, a consistent answer is defined in terms of all the minimal repairs of a database. In [3] the set cover problem was used to find repairs of databases w.r.t. denial constraints.
There are a number of possible directions for future work, including running experiments for the proposed algorithms, studying consistency for more general security policies specified using XPath expressions or constraints, investigating the complexity of and algorithms for other classes of repairs, and considering more general DTDs.
A Proofs
A.1 Proofs from Section 4
In this appendix we outline a detailed proof of correctness for our characterization of policy consistency (Theorem 1). The proof is not deep, but requires considering many combinations of cases. The main difficulty is in proving that rules 1, 2, and 3 imply consistency, since this involves showing that for a consistent policy, there is no way to simulate a single forbidden operation via a sequence of allowed operations. The obvious approach by induction on the length of the allowed sequence does not work because subsequences of the allowed sequence do not necessarily continue to simulate the denied operation.
The solution is to establish the existence of an appropriate normal form for update sequences, such that (roughly speaking):
1. The normal form of an update sequence a applied to input t is
consisting of a sequence of deletes, then replacements, then inserts 2. The replacements r can be partitioned into "chained" subsequences r 1 , . . . , r j that of the form r i = replace(m i , u
No deleted or replaced node (n i or m j ) is an ancestor of another of the modified nodes (n i , m j , l k ) 5. Allowed update sequences have allowed normal forms. Pictorially, a normalized update sequence can be visualized as a tree with some of its nodes "annotated" with insertion operations insert(u), deletions delete, and replacement sequences replace(u 1 , . . . , u n ), such that no annotation occurs below a node with a delete or replace annotation. Such annotations can be viewed as instructions for how to construct [[a]](t) from T .
Normalized update sequences are much easier to analyze than arbitrary allowed sequences in the proof of the reverse direction of Theorem 1.
We introduce some additional helpful notation: write node(delete(n)) = n node(insert(n, u)) = n node(replace(n, u)) = n for the "principal" node of an operation; write ≤ t for the ancestor-descendant ordering on t (that is, E * ); write ⊥ t for the relation {(n, m) ∈ N t × N t | n ≤ t m and m ≤ t n} (that is, n ⊥ t m means n and m are ≤ t -incomparable).
Proposition 3. Let P be a security policy and a an allowed update sequence mapping t to t ′ . Then there is an equivalent allowed update sequence a ′ that is in normal form.
Proof. We first note that the laws in Figures 4 , 5, and 6 are valid for rewriting update sequences relative to a given input tree t. We write op ≡ op ′ to indicate that the (partial) 
](t).
We can use these identities to normalize an update sequence as follows. First, move occurrences of inserts to the end of the sequence. Next, move deletes to the beginning of the sequence. Finally, we use the remaining rules to eliminate dependencies among deletes, replacements and inserts, and to build chains of replacements. The resulting sequence is in normal form.
Note that most of the identities only rearrange existing allowed updates and do not introduce any new update operations that we need to check against the policy. In a few cases, we need to do some work to check that the rewritten sequence is still allowed. For example, when we rewrite replace(n, u); delete(m) to delete(n) with m = r u , we need to verify that we are allowed to delete m; this is because we were allowed to delete n, which replaced m.
We say that two trees agree above n if the trees are equal after deleting the subtree rooted at n from each. Note that for all of the operations we consider, if op has principal node n and op is valid on t then t agrees with [[op]](t) above n.
Lemma 3. If t and t
′ are equal except under the subtree starting at n, and allowed sequence a maps t to t ′ , then there is an equivalent, normalized, allowed sequence a ′ that only affects nodes at or above n.
Proof. We show that for each node m unrelated to n, updates applying directly to m can be eliminated. If a deletion applies to m, then must be an insertion replacing the deleted subtree exactly, and these are the only updates affecting m. Thus, it is safe to remove this useless deletion-insertion pair. If a replacement applies to m, then there must be subsequent replacements that restore the subtree at m. This sequence of replacements can be eliminated. No other possibilities are consistent with t and t ′ being equal except at n. Thus, by considering each node m in the tree that is unrelated to n, and removing the updates having an effect on m, we can obtain an equivalent update sequence a ′ having only updates whose principal node is related to n. This update sequence is still allowed since we have only removed allowed operations (and since all of the operations we have removed are independent of the remaining ones), and can also be further normalized if necessary.
If t, t ′ agree above n, and a is an allowed sequence, then we define the n-related normal form of a to be an equivalent allowed, normalized sequence of operations affecting the tree above or below n, which must exist by the above lemma.
Proof of Theorem 1. For the forward direction, we prove the contrapositive. As argued in Section 4, any violations of the above properties suffice to show that a policy is inconsistent.
For the reverse direction, we again prove the contrapositive. Suppose P is inconsistent, and let t be a tree, a a sequence allowed on t, and d denied on t by P , such that
. We consider the four cases for d:
-d = insert(n, t). Consider the normal form of the a restricted to the updates related to n. Clearly a cannot consist only of updates at or below n since an insertion at n cannot be simulated by a deletion or replacement at n or by any operations that only apply below n. If there is a deletion above n, there must also be an insertion above n that restores the extra deleted nodes and also has the effect of insert(n, t).
Hence there is a violation of rule 1. Otherwise, if there is a replacement above node n, then there must be one or more replacements restoring the rest of the tree to its previous form and inserting t, violating rule 3 (since the chain of replacements must be allowed by a cycle in some graph G A ) -d = delete(n, t), replace(n, s). Similar to case for insert, since again these operations cannot be simulated solely by operations at or below n. -d = replace(n, v). There are two possibilities. If the n-related normal form of a consists only of replacements at n, then the policy must violate rule 2. Otherwise, an argument similar to that in the above cases can be used to show that P must violate rule 1 or 3. Proof of Lemma 1. Since both P and Q extend R, we have A P , A Q ⊇ A R and
Proof of Lemma 2. By cases according to the definition of T . If uat ∈ S then there is nothing to do.
If for some A, B we have uat = (C, op) with B ≤ D C, with production rule A → B * , {(A, insert(B)), (A, delete(B))} ⊆ S, then let n = node(op 0 ), let m be the B-labeled node above m in t (there must be exactly one), and let t ′ be the subtree of t rooted at m. We can simulate op 0 by deleting the B-labeled subtree to which op 0 applies, then inserting the tree resulting from applying op 0 ; thus, the sequence op = delete(m); insert(n, [[op 0 ]](t ′ ) simulates op 0 and is allowed. If for some A, B we have uat = (C, op) with then let B i1 , . . . , B i k be a cycle in G A beginning and ending with B i . Again let n = node(op 0 ), m be the (unique) B i -labeled node above n, and t ′ be the subtree of t rooted at m. Let t 1 , . . . , t k−1 be arbitrary trees disjoint from t and satisfying t j ∈ I D (B ij ). (The latter sets are always nonempty so such trees may be found.) Now consider the update sequence op = replace(m, t1); replace(rtt 1 , t2); . . . ; replace(rtt n−2 , tn−1); replace(rtt n−1 ,
This update sequence is allowed on t and simulates op 0 .
Finally, if for some B 1 , . . . , B n we have uat = (C, replace(B i , B j )), where Rg D (C) = B 1 +. . .+B n , (B i , B j ) ∈ G + C (S) then let n = node(op 0 ), let t ′ be the subtree rooted at n. Let B i1 , . . . , B i k be a sequence of nodes forming a path from B i = B i1 to B j = B i k in G C , and choose t 1 , . . . , t k−1 satisfying t l ∈ I D (B i l ). Then the update sequence op = replace(n, t1); replace(rtt 1 , t2); . . . ; replace(rtt n−2 , tn−1); replace(rtt n−1 ,
again is allowed and simulates op 0 . 2
A.2 Proofs from Section 5
Proof of Theorem 3. We will concentrate on the total-repair problem. The proof for partial-repair problem is analogous. First we will prove that the total-repair is in NP. We can determine if there is a repair
by guessing a policy P ′ , checking if |A \ A ′ | < k and if it is consistent. Since consistency and the distance can be checked in polynomial time, the algorithm is in NP. To prove that the problem is NP-hard, we reduce the edge-deletion transitive-digraph problem which is NP-complete [20, 19] . The problem consists in, given a directed graph G = (V, E) with V = {v 1 , . . . , v n } and E a set of edges without self-loops, determine if there exists a set G ′ = (V, E ′ ) such that E ′ ⊆ E, G ′ is transitive and |E \ E ′ | < k. Now, let us define a DTD D and a policy P . The production rules of D are:
A → v 1 + · · · + v n v i → str for i ∈ [1, n] The policy P = (A, F ) is such that A = {(A, replace(v i , v j ))|(v i , v j ) ∈ E} ∪ {(v i , replace(str, str)) | v i ∈ V} and F = valid(D) \ A. It is easy to see that G A = G and therefore finding a repair will consist on finding the minimal number of edges to delete from G to make the graph transitive.
Proof of Theorem 4. Given an inconsistency policy P = (A, F ), Let us assume, by contradiction, that the policy P ′ = (A ′ , F ′ ) returned by algorithm Repair is not a repair. Since P ′ is defined over D, and by construction P ′ ≤ P , this implies that P ′ is not consistent. Then, it should be the case that either the changes returned by:
1. InsDelRepair do not solve all the insert/delete-inconsistencies. This implies that there is a node A with production rule A → B * such that (A, insert(B)) ∈ A ′ , (A, delete(B)) ∈ A ′ and there is at least one forbidden UAT, say (C, op), such that B ≤ D C. Since P ′ ≤ P , (A, insert(B)) ∈ A and (A, delete(B)) ∈ A. If we prove that there is always an operation (G, op) ∈ F such that B ≤ D G, the marked DTD graph would be such that χ(A) =⊥. Then, either (A, insert(B)) or (A, delete(B)) would have been in the changes returned by InsDelRepair and one of them wouldn't have belonged to P ′ . Now we will prove that such (G, op) always exists. If (C, op) ∈ F, then, (G, op) = (C, op). On the other hand, if (C, op) ∈ F then (C, op) is either one of the changes returned by InsDelRepair or ReplaceRepair: (a) If (C, op) was a change returned by InsDelRepair, then there was an insertdelete inconsistency, and there is another UAT (F, op2) ∈ F such that C ≤ D F . As a consequence B ≤ D F , and we have found (G, op).
(b) If (C, op) was a change returned by ReplaceRepair this would mean that (C, op) was either involved in a negative-cycle or forbidden-transitivity. The former implies there is another UAT (F, op2) ∈ F such that C ≤ D F . Then, B ≤ D F , and we have found (G, op). The latter case implies there is at least one other (C, op2) ∈ F . We have found (G, op).
ReplaceRepair do not solve all the replace-inconsistencies: This implies that
there is a node A with production rule A → B 1 + · · · + B n such that one of the following holds: (a) There is an edge (B i , B j ) in G , replace(B i , B j ) ) it implies that it was part of the changes returned by ReplaceRepair. Since both, ReplaceNaive and ReplaceSetCover check that the final graph has no forbidden-transitivity, this is not possible. (b) There is a B i which is part of a cycle in G A for P ′ and there is a UAT (C, op) ∈ F ′ s.t. B i ≤ D C. Since B i is in a cycle in G A for P ′ , it should be part of a cycle in G A for P . If (C, op) ∈ F, then the inconsistency would have been solve. On the other hand, if (C, op) ∈ F, then (C, op) is either one of the changes returned by InsDelRepair or ReplaceRepair. By an analogous reasoning as in cases 1(a)-1(b), this is not possible either. Therefore, P ′ is consistent and is a repair of P . 
Algorithm 8 Repair
Input: DTD graph GD, security policy P = (A, F), boolean total Output: A repair P ′ of P . The repair is total if parameter total= 1, partial otherwise. 1: changes ← InsDelChecking(GD, P ) ∪ ReplaceRepair(GD, P ) 2: A ′ ← A − changes 3: if total then 4:
